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REVIEW OF MARY MIDGLEY'S

ANIMALS AND
WHY THEY MATTER
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DONALD VANDEVEER
North Carolina State University

I have never met Mary Midgley, but read
ing her Animals and Why They Matter makes me
think she is, indeed, a sly person.
After
all, innocent purchasers of her book expect
to read about our treatment of animals, but
Midgley sneaks in, for a start, essays about
our treatment of slaves, wanen, the concept
of equality, the ];Ower of symbolism, the
concept of errotion, and the demonstrable
myopia of most of the so-called great think
ers of the western tradition.
She does all
this with verve, oonsiderable
learning,
and
considerable
with refreshing turns of phrase; for example,
on Hobbes' identification of injustice as the
non-perfonnance of contract, she notes that
"it is impossible to extract from this tiny
hat that large rabbit, !lOrality."
lOClrality." She also
exhibits a nice, down-to-earth sensitivity to
facts.
In discussing R. G. Frey's "no de
sires without beliefs and no beliefs without
language" thesis, and against the doubt that
a dog could
oould desire or choose to perform a
certain act every Friday, Midgley calls at
tention to the notable case of one guide-dog
who s];Ontaneously took her owner shopping
each Friday without being told.
Against the
skeptics and perverse behaviorists (if ~~at
tl1at
is not a redundant fhrase) who deny that
animals have moods, feelings, or "inner men
tal processes," she reminds us of the mahouts
(eler:hant
handlers) who would likely be
killed if they could
oould not ascertain that an
eler:hant was angry.
In brief, then, one
might complain that this book is not what one
bargained for.
Happily, however, and unlike
a familiar result, one gets more rather than
less.
Indeed, it is rare that a philosofhy
book is brief, incisive, far-ranging, clear,
and cogently argued.
Sane books ought to be
read but doing so is a chore.
Animals and
Why They Matter is both instructive and sa
tisfying.

tion of the book's focus is in order.
of the book is devoted to identifying

Much
those

doctrines, quasi
quasi-articulated
-articulated reasons, atti
atti
tudes, and psychological shards which tend to
block us from thinking clearly about (non
human) animals and about our lOClral
!lOral relation
ship with them.
That these obstacles are
very great is born out by the enorrrous
enormous ne
glect of such matters by !lOst
most of the thinkers
tI1at
It is also bom
Ulat Vle
Vle label "the greats."
born
out by name-calling, disdain, and cheap shots
that emanate from people who, on certain
topics, are anvng the best and brightest
from ordinary people down to scientists and
fhilosofhers.
Although a good deal of work
has occurred--analyzing the arguments con
cerning duties toward, or rights of, animals
--in the last decade or so, we still hear the
from those
same shoddy claims or arguments fran
who do not question the status quo, e.g., we
lack contractual
oontractual relations with animals, they
lOClral
don't talk (as we do), they are not !lOral
agents, not experimenting on them YIOuld
would im
pede science, maybe they lack feelings, after
all they're not hurran,
human, and so on. As if such
oonsiderations are all true, or if true, as
considerations
i f they clearly settled the displtes.
Midg
ley, with understanding, fairness, and care
dismantles a good number of these views, in
particular those which appeal to natural
competition, to the claim that those who
believe in duties to animals are too emotion
al, to rationalist considerations (which tend
to deny that justice is owed to the non
self-oonscious, e.g.,
rational or those not self-conscious,
Hurne, Kant, and Rawls). In a later chapter
(7), Midgley tellingly illustrates how sane
Hurne, Kant, and Rous
of "the greats" (e.g., Hume,
lose" or not employ, their
seau) tend to lose:,
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Typically, after a few generous remarks,
'l'ypically,
reviewers go on to identify real or alleged
flaws and, shortly, I shall try to articulate
arti.culate
a few reservations. First, a bit of descrip
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rational capacities on c~~in topics, e.g.,
the treabnent of wanen.
Thus, Rousseau
claims that "wanan is specially made for
man I s delight." The point of this attention
to
consideration of historical attitudes
toward wanen, slaves, or the "Indians" in
America is, of course, to illustrate our most
imperfect rationality, Le., our capacity to
both think clearly on some topics and have a
kind of intellectualmelt-down on certain
issues.
Thus, our myopia (to switch meta
phors) about animals is not unusual.
There
has been a problem about getting people to
think more clearly by teaching them sane
logic.
I still believe the practice useful,
but as the cases mentioned suggest, people
still just do not think at all when it comes
to certain issues, or else their reasoning
capacities seem to be on vacation.
Midgley
is sensitive to ~1is and illustrates well how
our prejudices and ambivalences cloud our
thinking about animals.
The book functions to enlighten as the
Gennans would have it, an Aufklarung, a
clearing up; it helps sweep away much of the
historical intellectual trash which prevents
us from taking animals seriously. Why should
we do so?
Midgley's answer, in brief, is
that we should in many cases for reasons
quite similar to the reasons we take people
seriously, i.e., why they matter.

Barry Kent MacKey

billal Protection Inet1 t:ute (API) _
Canada

Thus, Midgley is unwilling to accept certain
radically egalitarian (across species) views
as well as the traditional "absolute dismis
sal" of the view that animals matter.
This
quasi-rroderate
quasi
-rroderate position is, I believe, the
right one (as I have argued elsewhere).[l]
However, the implications of this outlook
need to be developed and articulated further.

What follows with respect to how we
should treat them?
On this crucial point we
hear little in this voltnne.
Midgley speaks
judiciously and cautiously. She is not obvi
0usly an all-out utilitarian, and she gives
no evidence here of believing that ani.mals
have rights (in some sense beyond merely
being objects of duties).
Unlike the posi
tions of Peter Singer and Tan Regan, she does
not beat the drt.nn for an abolition of facto
ry-farming, most or all experimentation on
animals, or most or all hunting.
Does she
believe animals (or some) have "equal inher
ent value" (as do, let us assume, normal
people) or that equal interests (animal or
human) should be given equal moral weight?
If I read her correctly, the answer is nega
tive, or perhaps, that we do not know. She
does suggest that there are serious problems
about

So, much is left undone in this voltnne,
but it is a wise little bcok.
Too many
discussions fixate only on whether ani.mals
matter and why.
Midgley tries to settle
these matters. Next, we need to focus on how
much they matter and what follows vis-a-vis
our dealings with them.
Midgley does not in
this volume try to settle these matters. [2]
Concerning them, we need careful argument for
here perplexities and errotions run deep.
On
this point, I believe Midgley would agree.
Notes
1. See "Interspecific Justice," in Peo
ople, Penguins, and Plastic Trees, edited by
myself
and Christine Pierce
(Wadsworth,
1986) •

the exchange-rate at the species
barrier.
• this rate can indeed
not be set, quite at par--that
"speciesism" is not just an irra
tional prejudice. (p. 26)
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2. This reviewer has not, however, read
Nidgley's volume, Beast an~ !"Jan.
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